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CASE STUDY OF A HYDROELECTRIC DAM: THE 
DICKEY-LINCOLN SCHOOL PROJECT 
By Cortis Cooper* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For years, man has searched for the perfect energy source; a de-
vice which would be inexpensive to build, easy to maintain, and 
utilize a costless fuel to create large amounts of useable pollution-
free energy. As the symptoms of an energy crisis, whether real or 
manufactured, have become more painfully obvious, this search for 
the ideal energy source has intensified. In the past, hydroelectric 
dams were considered by many to be man's closest approximation 
to that perfect source. However, as his experience with hydro-power 
has grown, man has found that the truism "there is no such thing 
as a free lunch" also applies to hydroelectricity. Trade-off's must be 
made. Dickey-Lincoln is a prime example of a dam, designed pri-
marily to generate electricity, where many paradoxical exchanges 
would have to be made. It is hoped that this article will serve to 
illustrate some fundamental problems inherent in hydroelectric pro-
jects per se, problems common to such projects wherever they are 
located. 
The important insights gained from discussion of Dickey-Lincoln 
go beyond clarification of these trade-off's. From a close look at the 
project, one can learn how the government has made economic eval-
uation of large-scale water resource projects for the past 20 years. 
Most of the major shortcomings of these evaluation standards will 
come to light. Continued inspection of Dickey-Lincoln will intro-
duce one to the new federal evaluation standards for water and land-
related resources-procedures which will no doubt apply for many 
years to come. 
Lastly, Dickey-Lincoln serves (1) to remind one of the complex 
eff'ects that a large scale project has on a surrounding region and 
(2) to point out the inadequacies of current evaluation techniques 
in simplifying these complexities enough to permit decision-making 
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to be grounded on known facts rather than unproven assumptions 
or tenuous hopes. 
II. PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
The Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes Project would consist of two 
hydroelectric dams to be located on the Upper Saint John River 
near Maine's border with Canada (Figure I). The project would be 
built with federal appropriations, with a part of the initial invest-
ment to be paid back by the revenues received from power genera-
tion. 
The larger of the two dams, Dickey, would be located immedi-
ately above the confluence of the St. John with the Allagash River. 
The 10,600 ft. long, 335 ft. high, earth-fill dam is designed to hold 
7.6 million acre-feet in a reservoir which would stretch 57 miles up 
the St. John River. To contain this 140 square mile reservoir, and 
prevent it from spilling over into neighboring watersheds, several 
dikes would be built. Included in the dam itself would be eight large 
turbines, each capable of 95 megawatts (MW), yielding a combined 
total of 760 MW. 
Lincoln School Dam would be located 11 miles downstream from 
Dickey Dam. It would be 1,600 feet long, 85 feet high, with a useful 
storage capacity of 24,000 acre-feet. Though its primary purpose 
would be to regulate the relatively sudden discharges which would 
occur from Dickey Dam, I it too would produce electricity from two 
turbines, 35 MW each, for a total of 70 MW. 2 
Altogether Dickey-Lincoln would have 830 MW of electrical ca-
pacity. The current plan is to sell 105 MW as base load to Maine at 
a 50% capacity factor (i.e. some turbines would operate approxi-
mately 12 hrs/day). The remaining 725 MW would be sold as peak-
ing power to New England, principally Boston, at a 10% capacity 
factor (i.e. all turbines would operate approximately 2.4 hrs/day). 
III. HISTORY OF THE PROJECT 
The Dickey-Lincoln Project metamorphosed out of a proposal to 
generate electrical power from the relatively high-amplitude tidal 
cycles found at Passamaquoddy Bay on the Maine-Canada border. 
A comprehensive report into the possibilities of such a project was 
first compiled in 1959 by the International Joint Commission3 with 
the aid of the Corps of Engineers. In this original report the Corps 
proposed that a hydroelectric plant also be installed in the Upper 
St. John watershed. This dam would serve as an auxiliary source of 
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power to help level out the large fluctuations in output inherent in 
tidal power. 
In 1965, the Department of Interior reviewed the project. They 
found that due to increased output and improved efficiency by the 
power industry in New England at other generating facilities, the 
relative power benefits from the proposed project fell, in turn caus-
ing the combined benefit/cost (B/C) rati04 to fall below unity. How-
ever, when the Dickey-Lincoln Project was evaluated on its own, the 
B/C ratio was found to be 1.81. The Department subsequently rec-
ommended immediate construction of Dickey-Lincoln. 
That same year, an omnibus bill containing authorization for 
Dickey-Lincoln was narrowly passed by Congress. 25 of 28 New 
England congressmen voted against the bill containing the Dickey-
Lincoln Project.5 In 1966 and 1967, Congress appropriated enough 
money for the Corps to continue pre-construction planning of 
Dickey-Lincoln, but not enough to begin any actual construction.6 
During the House Public Works Subcommittee hearings on public 
works appropriations in 1967, Dickey-Lincoln was given much de-
bate.7 Opposition to the Project was led primarily by the New Eng-
land power companies.8 They saw Dickey-Lincoln as the initial step 
towards government-owned energy generation facilities in the re-
gion. Proponents of the project included the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, who planned and would build Dickey-Lincoln, together 
with a few New England politicians and Maine citizens groups, 9 who 
saw the project as a means of getting cheap electrical power as well 
as providing much needed stimulation of the Maine economy. 
During the hearings many serious doubts were raised about the 
project. Opponents claimed that the private utilities' power prices 
were continually dropping, thus reducing the high electrical rates 
which are paid by New Englanders and in turn reducing the need 
for hydro-power. 1O In addition, the validity of the Corps' construc-
tion cost estimates was also questioned. 11 Largely because of the 
doubts expressed during these hearings, Congress denied any addi-
tional money towards the project and has, in the intervening years, 
continued to do so. 
lt would seem that after so many refusals the project would have 
long since been relegated to the dreams of a few stubborn engineers. 
But the sudden jump in oil prices and the attendant shortages have 
revived the Dickey-Lincoln Project. The Corps' updated figures in-
dicate a B/C ratio of 2.6, a dramatic increase. 12 As a result of these 
changes some old foes such as Boston Edison, caught in the public 
relations turmoil created by the "energy crisis", have muted their 
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opposition considerably.13 Consequently, on June 6, 1974 the House 
Public Works Subcommittee added $800,000 to the fiscal year 1975 
budget to update preconstruction planning for Dickey-Lincoln.14 
Despite the apparent shift of support to Dickey-Lincoln there are 
still many fundamental questions to be resolved. Most of these 
questions center around the Corps' economic analysis of the project. 
IV. CORPS OF ENGINEERS BENEFlT-80ST ANALYSIS 
As can be seen from Table I, the Corps has chosen to evaluate the 
Dickey-Lincoln Project by means of a benefit-cost ratio. This crite-
rion is the one recommended in a report by the U.S. Congress con-
cerning the evaluation of water resource projects. 15 The B/C ratio 
used by the Corps can be defined as: 
B/C t · annual benefits 
ra 10 = annual costs 
where total annual costs include recurring costs such as yearly 
maintenance and operating costs, plus an additional payment. This 
additional sum represents the repayment of a portion of the initial 
capital investment and is entered as "Interest and Amortization" 
in Table I. The magnitude of this yearly payment is given by the 
capital recovery factor (crf) which is a function of the social discount 
rate and the project life. Likewise, total annual benefits would in-
clude not only benefits that recur each year (Le. recreation, power, 
etc.) but also an additional portion representing "lump" benefits 
that might occur occasionally during the project life; e.g., flood 
control. Again the factor determining the magnitude of this added 
portion is the crf.18 
As of 1970, the benefit-cost ratio was probably the most popular 
criterion for evaluating projects in the U.SY The B/C ratio is popu-
lar because it provides a simple, neat, relatively easy means of pro-
ject evaluation. It has, however, immense shortcomings. The B/C 
ratio is a single value function and as such is necessarily inadequate 
for evaluating multipurpose, large scale projects. IS For example, it 
cannot reveal how benefits or costs are distributed (Le. whether a 
prince or a pauper receives the benefits of the project.) Like other 
discount-dependent techniques, the B/C ratio cannot adequately 
deal with the future. In addition to these more general shortcom-
ings, common to all single-valued criteria, the B/C ratio usually 
underrates the productivity of a project with high annual costs. 
Examples can easily be found where the B/C ratio of project A may 
be considerably higher than the ratio for B, yet the net present 
benefitsl9 of project B may be greater than that for A. In other words, 
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the project which would yield the larger profits (in present dollars) 
may not necessarily have the higher B/C ratio. 
Yet another troublesome characteristic of the B/C ratio is that, 
unlike the net present benefit criterion, costs cannot be considered 
disbenefits or vice-versa. For example, the Corps has claimed a $1-
1/4 million recreational benefit will result if Dickey-Lincoln is built. 
Many opponents of the project argue that there will be a net loss to 
recreationalists if the project is completed. The question arises as 
to whether this alleged loss should be included on the benefit side 
of the analysis (i.e. as a minus benefit) or the cost side. Because the 
B/C ratio is a proportion and not a sum like the net present benefit 
criteria, it may be significantly affected according to which side of 
the analysis this reaction term is placed on. 
The Corps of Engineers has ascertained that the B/C ratio of the 
Dickey-Lincoln project is 2.6; alternatively expressed, for every $1 
of cost the project will yield $2.60 of benefits. A seemingly impres-
sive investment! However, it should be clear from the above discus-
sion that one cannot rule upon the worthiness of a project simply 
on the basis of the B/C ratio. A deeper evaluation of the project is 
almost always needed. 
As noted previously, the Corps' benefit-cost analysis is based pri-
marily upon predecessors of S.D. #97. The "Green Book", as it is 
popularly called, was originally issued in 1950; it and several small 
revisions have been the basis for the planning of water resources and 
related projects in the U.S. (as well as much of the world) for the 
last two decades. Among its many faults, this document placed the 
increase of the national income20 as the only explicit objective for 
government projects in the water resources field. Only a half-
hearted attempt was made to provide for consideration of more 
intangible objectives such as environmental quality and social wel-
fare. Thus the Green Book caused planners to evaluate essentially 
multipurpose projects in terms of only a single objective (i.e. na-
tional income).21 The trend towards correcting this lack of mul-
tiobjective planning as well as other inadequacies began with publi-
cation in 1962 of Senate Document 87-9722 and culminated in late 
1973 when the President approved the Water Resources Council's 
(WRC) latest draft of the Principles and Standards for Planning of 
Water and Related Land Resources.23 This latter document repre-
sents the end result of over five years of work by a special task force 
composed of planning experts and members of interested federal 
agencies (Le. the Department ofInterior, EPA, etc.). This document 
replaces previous criteria including S.D. #97 as the standard by 
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which all federally financed water and related land-resource pro-
jects will be evaluated.24 Unlike the Green Book, this document 
establishes as objectives the enhancement of: (1) a more broadly 
defined national income known as "national economic 
development"; (2) environmental quality; (3) regional development 
and (4) social welfare.25 The document specifies that a list of all 
beneficial and adverse affects are to be measured in monetary terms 
where possible, discounted, and the net present benefits of each 
quantifiable objective calculated. 26 For items which are non-
monetary in nature, the document requires a complete qualitative 
list of the projects' effectsY Methods and procedures for calculating 
many of the tangible effects of the project are included.28 Guidelines 
are provided for the entire planning phase and they can be consid-
ered a complete presentation of multiobjective planning theory.29 
The steps are: 
(1) Specify the components of the four objectives which are relevant 
to the plan setting; 
(2) Evaluate resource capabilities and expected economic conditions 
without the plan; 
(3) Formulate alternative plans to achieve varying levels of contribu-
tions to the specified components of the four objectives; 
(4) Analyze the differences among the alternative plans which reflect 
different emphasis among the specified components of the four objec-
tives; 
(5) Review and reconsider if necessary the specified components of the 
four objectives for the plan setting and formulate if necessary additional 
alternative plans and 
(6) Select a recommended plan based on an evaluation of trade-offs 
among the alternative plans.30 
It is safe to say that the new criteria will go a long way toward 
providing a much more complete, undistorted view of all the issues 
involved in a proposed project. The new document avoids most of 
the inadequacies associated with the BIC ratio and single-objective 
analysis. As will be noted, it also establishes a much more realistic 
discount rate. It remains to be seen whether or not the somewhat 
"construction-prone" federal agencies will faithfully adhere to the 
much more rigid code. Certainly the advantages of doing so are not 
costless, since now the planning process will become even more 
complex and difficult, thus requiring additional funds which could 
have instead been applied to the creation of more tangible products. 
The Corps, having recently received the funding necessary to up-
date its Dickey-Lincoln analysis, must, according to the WRC, use 
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the new criteria if they result in a "substantially reformulated 
analysis."31 It would seem that application of the new standards 
would indeed result in a substantial change in the analysis, if for 
no other reason than that the new standards' discount rate is more 
than double the one currently used. This larger discount rate must 
necessarily have a profound effect on the Corps' current analysis 
(June 1974). Despite the fact that the Corps' analysis format is 
subject to change, a careful examination of the current analysis is 
still called for, in order to shed light on most of the important issues 
of Dickey-Lincoln. 
A. COSTS 
A glance at the Corps' B/C analysis (Table I) shows that one 
entry, "Interest and Amortization", would constitute 73% of the 
total annual costs incurred by the project. This high percentage is 
a rather obvious result of the capital-intensive nature of the project. 
Its magnitude makes it a critically important factor in the final B/C 
analysis. This quantity (Interest and Amortization) in turn is de-
pendent on the initial construction costs of the dam, the project life, 
and the social discount rate. Because of their importance in the final 
outcome of the B/C ratio and because of their inherently controver-
sial nature, we shall examine each of these in detail. 
1. Social Discount Rate. The social discount rate is the discount 
rate to be used on public projects. There are few topics in federal 
project evaluation which evoke so much controversy. This follows 
from the sensitivity of the B/C calculation to changes in the dis-
count rate applied. To illustrate this point, Fox and Hefindahl32 
evaluated projects authorized for construction by the Corps in 1962 
with discount rates of 4, 6 and 8%. They found that at such rates, 
9, 64, and 80%, respectively, of these projects would be uneconomi-
cal. Changes in the discount rate have a similar effect on the B/C 
ratio of Dickey-Lincoln (Figure IT). 
The need to discount future benefits (or costs) is based on the fact 
that a dollar in hand today is worth more than a dollar in hand ten 
years hence. How much less that future dollar is worth depends on 
how far in the future it will be received. The farther into the future, 
the less the dollar is presently worth. Or as Howe33 puts it: 
Present value of future benefits = do v 0 + d 1 VI + d 2V 2 + . . . 
dnvn where Vn is a benefit falling in year n. The weights d n are 
assumed to decrease into the future in a geometric fashion akin to 
compound interest. Thus: 
dn = 
1 
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where r is the rate at which future revenues are discounted or more 
precisely the "discount rate". 
In the past years, two dominant schools of thought have emerged 
concerning evaluation of the discount rate. The first takes into ac-
count the fact that people, as indicated above, show a willingness 
to pay a premium (interest) in order to expedite the immediate 
acquisition of goods. This frequently exhibited preference for satis-
faction today over satisfaction tomorrow is referred to as a positive 
time preference.34 The rate of interest at which the individual is 
undecided as to whether to save or spend is called his time rate of 
preference and should be equivalent to the individual's discount 
rate. As might be expected, people as a group also exhibit a positive 
time preference. Society's time rate of preference is equivalent to 
the social discount rate, since this time rate reflects society's feel-
ings about providing for the future as opposed to current consump-
tion. Advocates of the time rate of preference method of determining 
the social discount rate tend to go further. They argue that provision 
for the future is a socially good deed. They also maintain that be-
cause private decisions concerning consumption and investment 
neglect nonquantifiable benefits of providing for future generations, 
the level of private investment is too low. To compensate for this 
supposed tendency to under-save, advocates of this theory argue 
that society should increase its public investment by adopting a 
social discount rate which is below private sector rates.35 There are 
many problems with this attitude. First, we are currently devoting 
nearly 30% of GNP towards investment for the future. 38 The next 
generation will probably have a higher standard of living.37 Should 
we save even a larger percentage towards the future, when poverty, 
malnutrition, etc., are so prevalent today? Second, the use of a 
social discount rate below that in private sectors may be wasteful 
since it implies that resources will be transferred from higher return 
alternatives in the private sector to lower return investments in the 
public sector.as Third, the social time rate of preference is virtually 
impossible to measure quantitatively. 
The second dominant method of evaluating the discount rate uses 
the opportunity cost concept. Proponents of this method cite two 
economic principles as the basis for their position. The first princi-
ple is that no investment is worth undertaking unless it is at least 
as productive as any comparable investment commonly available. 
Second, the rate at which any potential investment should be dis-
counted is the rate of return which the best alternative will yield. 
This follows necessarily from the proposition that if the available 
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capital is used in the best investment, the benefits of the next best 
alternative must be forgone. The opportunity cost to the investor of 
not having additional money and hence the time value of money to 
him, is the rate of return on the next-best alternative. The time 
value of money should equal the discount rate. 39 Using the first 
principle, advocates of the opportunity cost method argue that the 
government, in its role as society's investor, should not undertake 
any public investment which produces less value than that to be 
expected from an alternative use of the same investment capital. 
From this it follows that the minimum social rate of return of a 
project should at least equal to a comparable investment in paying 
off the public debt (i.e., the long-term bond rate). For projects 
begun in the 1970's this minimum risk free rate should be about 
4%.40 Advocates, however, say that the government can do better 
than this long-term bond rate. As evidence, they cite the fact that 
the government derives its money from the private sector where 
rates of return are typically higher than this bond rate. It follows, 
then, that this private sector rate would be the smallest rate which 
a public project should yield, since presumably the capital needed 
for the public project could instead remain in the private sector, 
earning the private rate of return. Applying the second principle 
mentioned above, supporters of the opportunity cost theory main-
tain that because this private rate of return is the best alternative 
investment for society, it is the social discount rate. To find the 
private rate, one must trace the origin of the capital used on a public 
project to its specific source in the private sector. Because of the 
complexity of the economy, the problem of measuring this social 
opportunity cost is difficult and experts have taken many different 
approaches, each with its own simplifying assumptions, in an effort 
to resolve it. The reader who is interested in this subject is referred 
to a discussion by Haveman of the different approaches taken for 
measuring the social opportunity cost.41 Suffice it to say here that 
various attempts by different experts at measuring the social dis-
count rate using this opportunity cost method have yielded values 
of 5,42 7_1/4, 43 8_10,44 and 10.4%.45 Some of the discrepancies in these 
values stem from the fact that each analysis was made at a different 
time and thus does not include effects of inflation. Moreover, differ-
ing assumptions made by the various analysts also contributed to 
the lack of agreement on the proper discount rate. 
There has been little mention of risk thus far. Obviously, the 
riskier a venture the higher return rates it requires to attract invest-
ment. In the past, planners have typically ignored adding a risk 
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premium when evaluating a federal project. This procedure has 
been called into question by many, including de Neufville and Staf-
ford. 46 They argue that on many federal projects there is a very real 
risk that a project will fail to live up to expectations. Benefits may 
not reach expected levels, and higher costs may be incurred than 
were planned for. Thus they conclude that risky projects should be 
required to show a higher rate of return, a risk premium, in order 
to make their expected return equal to the return on a risk-free 
investment. EcksteinH has determined that this risk premium 
should be about 0.5 to 1%, depending upon the amount of capital 
to be invested. 
The Corps has used a discount rate of 3V4%, based on S.D.#97. 
As Baumol has pointed out there are two major shortcomings with 
this document's determination of the social discount rate. First, the 
document attempts to establish a long-term government interest 
rate, but fails, because: (1) it averages the indicated or coupon rate 
on government bonds which, in 1970 for example, was half the effec-
tive rate to the buyer, and (2) it calculates the interest rate on the 
bonds as if they were all long-term in nature even though they 
become short-term bonds as their date of redemption approaches. 
Hence the result is to perpetuate a low discount rate. 48 
The social discount rate which will apply to all Federally sup-
ported water resource projects in the future is given by the WRC's 
new standards and procedures.49 This rate is based upon". . . the 
estimated average cost of Federal borrowing as determined by the 
Secretary of the Treasury taking into consideration the average 
yield during the twelve months preceding his determination on 
interest-bearing marketable securities of the U.S. with remaining 
periods to maturity comparable to a 50 year period of investment. "50 
A more specific description of the formulation procedure is not in-
cluded in the document, thus making the whole process of rate 
determination a bit mysterious. However, two points can be made. 
First, because the bonds are to have "remaining periods to maturity 
comparable to a 50 year period of investment," this procedure cor-
rects one of the major shortcomings of the Green Book's determina-
tion of the discount rate. Second, like the Green Book, the new WRC 
procedure bases its discount rate on the long term bond rate. Advo-
cates of the social opportunity cost position maintain that this is the 
minimum possible rate, for reasons previously discussed. 
Nevertheless, the 6%% rate set for this year (1974) is considerably 
higher than the rate used previously and is much closer to the rate 
advocated by supporters of the social opportunity cost theory. 
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Because this new rate is over twice the rate used in the current 
analysis of Dickey-Lincoln, there is reason for concern that the 
Corps will retain the old procedure in its updating of its evaluation 
of the project. To evaluate the project at the new discount rate 
would mean an immediate drop in the current BIC ratio from 2.62 
to about l.4-a drastic and unfavorable result from the Corps' view. 
If the Corps does indeed continue to discount at 31J4 % it should be 
clear by now that this rate is artificially low and the Corps has in 
effect decided to subsidize future generations. This sort of philan-
thropy may be a noble gesture; indeed, one's opinion about endow-
ments to future generations may very well determine which'social 
discount rate one prefers. 
2. Project Life. This is the second factor upon which the enor-
mously important "Interest and Amortization" quantity depends. 
As one can see from Figure II, change in the project life is a co-
variable with the discount rate in determining the BIC ratio. For 
example, if the rate is high (about 5% or greater), then a halving of 
the project life from 100 years to 50 years results in a lowering of the 
BIC ratio by only a few tenths. But by using a lower discount rate 
and assuming a 100 year project life, the BIC ratio will be more than 
0.7 greater than would result from equivalent analysis using a 50 
year life. Thus by using the questionably long 100 year project life 
and a low discount rate, the Corps has maximized the BIC ratio. 
But the Corps feels its postulated project life is realistic. While 
siltation is a potential problem in most hydroelectric projects, 51 sil-
tation does not appear especially likely to occur at Dickey-Lincoln, 
since hydroelectric dams downstream from the proposed site have 
experienced no such problem.52 As for the machinery within the 
dam, it would be large and understressed. With normal mainte-
nance and replacement of such machinery, dams previously con-
structed by the Corps and the Bureau of Land Reclamation have 
continued to function for many decades, 
There is, however, another problem involved. In its analysis the 
Corps tacitly assumes that the discount rate, costs and benefits are 
not functions of time. If the past is any indication of future trends, 
this is indeed an unrealistic assumption. For example, the value of 
an isolated area to recreationalists will no doubt skyrocket, as popu-
lation in urbanized areas increases. In addition, power benefits may 
at first out-distance rising costs, as the energy crisis becomes more 
acute. Yet in 75 years fusion power may be harnessed resulting in 
relatively costless electricity. Inflation may fluctuate by a factor of 
2 or 3 or more. All of this of course is speculation, but this is exactly 
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the point. By choosing a project life of 100 years the Corps is dealing 
with the uncertain future. This uncertainty is a hazard inherent in 
any major project analysis, but by choosing shorter time periods 
extrapolations of current trends become more valid and project 
evaluation becomes correspondingly less speculative. Thus the eco-
nomic method of present value discounting is completely inade-
quate when dealing with time spans as large as 100 years. If used, 
it may have misleading results. 
3. Construction Costs of Dam. This is the last of the three 
factors upon which "Interest and Amortization" depends. This fac-
tor, like the other two, is a nightmare for the quantitative mind. 
Current estimates of project costs vary up to 300%. State Senator 
Hathaway (pro) estimates $273 million; Boston Edison (against), $1 
billion; and the Corps of Engineers, $356 million. 53 
The Corps' current estimate is based upon its original study com-
pleted in the mid-60's. Since then the Corps has continued to up-
date these original figures. However, the lack of sufficient funding 
to support thorough re-study has compelled the Corps to accomplish 
this updating by the most expedient means available. The proce-
dure in essence consists of multiplying the original cost estimate by 
a "fudge factor." The factor is intended to make allowance for price 
changes which have occurred since the initial analysis. The final 
result is admittedly "quick but dirty." 
Naturally the updated costs are unlikely, except by accident, to 
be more accurate then the original estimates. In judging the accu-
racy of these original estimates the House Appropriations Subcom-
mittee in 1968 consulted a number of experts including a private 
engineering consulting firm, the New England Electric Coordinat-
ing Council (NECC) and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). 
Each had different opinions on the question, reflecting the intrinsic 
difficulty of cost estimation. 
The consulting firm of Charles T. Main, Inc. was hired by the 
NECC to evaluate the Corps' original estimate. The firm is a well-
established, Boston-based company which has had experience in 
water-resource projects. The Main firm estimated the cost of 
Dickey-Lincoln to be $7 1/2 million more than the Corps' 1964 esti-
mate of $210,500,000. Approximately half of this difference could be 
traced to a discrepancy in prices assumed by each for earth and rock 
fill. The Corps based its estimate on experience from past projects. 
The NECC raised several questions. First, they doubted the as-
sumption made by the Corps of a six month working season. The 
NECC claimed that the season would actually be much shorter, 
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thereby requiring the use of much more overtime in order to finish 
the project on schedule. The Corps' estimate was supported by Ca-
nadian experience with similar projects in the area. Second, the 
NECC doubted that the average labor wage would be as low as 
$4,500/year, the figure upon which the Corps' estimates were based. 
Somewhat more optimistic testimony was entered by the TVA. It 
concluded that the Corps' estimates did indeed include all the 
major items of cost and that the final estimate seemed reasonable. 
The TVA did note, however, that the Corps' cost projections were 
based on 1966 prices. Since the project would not be completed for 
6 V2 years, during which prices could be expected to rise, the TVA 
suggested that the Corps adjust those original costs upward at 4% 
per year in order to compensate. Doing so would add about 
$50,000,000 to the Corps' construction costs. 54 
In short, there are three major questions concerning the Corps' 
construction cost estimates. The first is the accuracy of the Corps' 
updating procedure. Because of the relatively recent revival of 
Dickey-Lincoln there has unfortunately been as yet no published 
independent studies concerning the validity of the Corps' updated 
figures. One can however form a tentative judgment concerning 
these figures. In 1966 the Corps' estimated costs were $230 million 
as compared to the 1974 costs of $356 million. This corresponds to 
an approximate 6% overall annual inflation rate, which would seem 
reasonable for that period of time. 
The second major question is that of wages. Intuitively, 
$4,500/year does seem at best conservative. Conceivably, this low 
average wage estimate could be justified. Thus far we have tacitly 
assumed that the true cost to society of each resource consumed by 
the project is adequately accounted for by its market price. This 
assumption has been reasonably correct to this point. However, in 
the case of wages this supposition is no longer valid. The St. John 
region suffers badly from unemployment and underemployment. It 
has been estimated by the Corps55 that 550 people from these two 
categories would be employed during the construction of the project. 
The question arises as to what is the true social cost of employing 
these under-used national resources. As Kenneth Arrow has pointed 
out,56 putting the idle worker or machine to work really costs society 
nothing, even though there is a wage or other price to be paid. In 
fact the project may even save society some money in the form of 
welfare payments and unemployment compensation, money for 
which society receives little substantial return. The government, as 
guardian of the nation's welfare, should reckon only with true social 
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costs. Hence, there is a benefit accruing to the national income 
objective by employing these resources. It is only a matter of book-
keeping57 as to where this quantity is included in the Corps' B/C 
analysis. It can be subtracted from total labor costs, thus making 
the average wage appear too low, or the value can be included as a 
benefit. But since the Corps has included these wages as a redevel-
opment benefit, it cannot subtract them from total construction 
costs. Therefore we can conclude that the average wage of 
$4,500/year used by the Corps is probably too low and has led, at 
least in part, to the discrepancy between the Main and Corps' con-
struction cost estimates. 
The third major question concerning the Corps' projected con-
struction costs centers on the "present cost" estimates of the Corps. 
There should be very little doubt that the construction costs should 
include inflationary increases that will occur during the project's 
construction. The Corps has implicitly recognized this fact every 
time it has updated its estimates. The TVA suggested that the costs 
be adjusted 4% per year but the Corps has recognized that construc-
tion costs have risen an average of 6%/year (Le. 1974-$356 million 
versus 1966-$230 million.) 
A current, disinterested, professional estimate is badly needed. Of 
the $800,000 recently appropriated by Congress towards Dickey-
Lincoln, none was set aside for such a study. Back in 1966, the Main 
estimate was financed by the utilities, then the major opponents of 
the project. As noted previously, the utilities have largely backed off 
from their opposition and their replacements on the negative side 
of the controversy, the conservationists, do not have the money to 
finance the new professional estimate needed. Though the Main 
estimate was not, in fact, completely independent (since it was 
financed by opponents), it did shed much needed light on the tech-
nical aspects of the project's analysis. Dickey-Lincoln is, in effect, 
on trial. It is extremely difficult to arrive at a reasonable verdict, 
when an important part of the testimony (Le. construction cost 
estimates) can be neither substantiated nor refuted, but must in-
stead be accepted or rejected largely on faith. 
4. Annual Costs-Dam. The largest entry (90% of the annual 
costs for dams is, as noted before, the "Interest and Amortization" 
quantity. Hence any criticism of the Corps' figures for maintenance, 
major replacements and loss of land taxes is of much less signifi-
cance unless it can be shown that these figures are considerably in 
error. Opponents argue that the "loss of land taxes" figures are 
indeed quite wrong. The Corps currently includes taxes lost from 
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lands which will be covered by the reservoir. Those against the 
project say the taxes lost figure should also include the federal and 
state taxes which would be paid by an equivalent private plant. The 
logic behind this argument will become more evident when we dis-
cuss how the government evaluates power benefits from Dickey-
Lincoln. Suffice it to say that if this argument succeeded it would 
result in the addition of approximately $2 million to the loss oftaxes 
column.58 
B. BENEFITS 
1. Power. A glance at the Corps' benefit analysis will show that 
one item, power, constitutes about 95% of the total benefits claimed 
for the project. Therefore the amount and price of that power is 
crucial to the outcome of the B/C ratio. 
The Corps' power analysis is divided into three categories. Under 
the first, "Marketed in Maine," is an entry which amounts to $5.411 
million. This quantity is the estimated charge to Maine customers 
of devoting 105 MW of capacity to them. This charge is incurred by 
the customers whether or not they are actually using any power. 
Under this fixed charge lies another quantity, the charge to the 
consumers for the number of hours during which that capacity is 
actually generating energy. In the case of Maine, 105 MW of capac-
ity would generate electricity for about 12 hrs/day. For Boston, 625 
MW of capacity would generate power for about 2 1/2 hrs/day. In-
cluded in both entries is a number less than unity which represents 
the transmission losses. The total cost of Maine's energy would be 
$0.022/kilowatt-hour (KWH). For Boston the cost would be 
$0.049!KWH, reflecting the more costly nature of peaking power. 
The last entry in the Corps' power benefit analysis is labeled 
"Downstream." This is energy that would result from increased 
output from Canadian hydroelectric plants downstream from 
Dickey-Lincoln. This increased output would be due to the regula-
tory effect Dickey-Lincoln would have on the flow of the St. John. 
The 350 megawatt-hours (MWH) figure represents half of the in-
creased output. The other half would go to Canada. 
The power prices used in the Corps' benefit analysis were derived 
by the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and are based on the 
"alternative cost" approach. This evaluation procedure is founded 
on the idea that market prices indicate what people are willing to 
pay for goods or services, and this willingness to pay can be taken 
as the measure of benefits or social value which are gained by con-
struction of the project. Some benefits such as recreation, flood 
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protection etc., do not have clearly defined market prices. However, 
in the case of power, which obviously does have a market price, the 
alternative cost concept has been widely used to evaluate power 
benefits created by hydro-projects in terms of the prices charged by 
a thermal power plant.59 The idea is that if the hydro-plant were not 
built, then the consumer would end up paying no less than the 
prices charged by the least-cost alternative thermal plant. The con-
cept can be abused. For instance, as Howe points out, it would 
obviously be wrong to evaluate alternative means of connecting the 
Columbia River to the Colorado River, by including as water bene-
fits for one scheme the price of delivering water by another alterna-
tive. 60 Upon evaluation, one scheme's net benefits would be higher 
than all others and it would be the best alternative. However, the 
implicit assumption that either a project or an alternative will in-
deed be built has resulted in a favorable analysis for the. plan, when 
in fact the plan may not be economical from the overall view of the 
nation. In the case of power benefits, this implicit assumption is 
generally valid. If the hydroelectric plant is not built, it is safe to 
say that utilities will build thermal plants to take the hydro-plant's 
place. However, if the nation's power demand is not rising, this "will 
be built anyway" assumption may not be true and application of the 
least-cost alternative concept would no longer be valid. 
There are other possible abuses of the alternative-cost concept. 
The .FPC, in evaluating the alternatives for Dickey-Lincoln, has 
committed most of these abuses, as we shall see. 
For electricity marketed in Boston the FPC determined that a gas 
turbine constructed by the private utilities and located in Boston 
would provide the least-cost alternative peaking power equivalent 
to Dickey-Lincoln. The alternative's prices would be $16.50/KW 
and $O.03/KWH, the prices used in the Corps' analysis for power 
marketed in Boston. For electricity marketed in Maine the Commis-
sion determined that the least-cost alternative would be a private 
fossil fuel steam plant located in Maine which would provide base 
power similar to that expected from Dickey-Lincoln. 
There are at least three reasons why the FPC's alternatives do not 
represent the true least-cost alternatives. First, Dickey-Lincoln 
would not produce many KWH compared to more modern facilities 
(only about one quarter of the yearly total of Edison's new Mystic 
River plant.)81 Hence the least-cost alternatives will necessarily be 
small in order to be equivalent and thus will not be able to take 
advantage of the increasing economies of scale experienced by 
larger, more efficient plants. 
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A second problem is that the FPC does not add to its least-cost 
price a surcharge to represent the social costs characteristic of the 
alternative, namely additional air and thermal pollution and the 
use of a nonrenewable resource. To quantify these types of social 
costs is concededly difficult and controversial, but the FPC simply 
avoided the difficulty by not including this surcharge. The analyst 
should not forget however that these social costs do exist and if 
quantifiable, would result in an increase in the primary project's 
benefits relative to those of the alternative.62 
The third major stumbling block stems from the way the FPC 
used the alternative cost technique. If the method is to work, it is 
essential that resources that would be needed for each of the alter-
natives be measured with the same set of prices. Since the discount 
rate is simply the price paid for the use of capital, it too must be 
uniform in comparing the alternatives. Uniformity of treatment 
must also extend to taxes, which are included in costs. If the costs 
of the public project include a reduced discount rate and smaller 
taxes than the alternative, then the net benefits of the project are 
overestimated. 63 
In addition to these two terms, the least-cost alternative should, 
in order to be equivalent, have approximately the same life-span as 
the project under consideration. Otherwise, one is trying to compare 
quite different benefit and cost streams.64 For example, the least-
cost alternative to a 50-year life project might be two consecutive 
25-year life thermal plants. It is quite doubtful that the FPC has 
taken such possibilities into account. To project the prices charged 
by the least-cost thermal alternative system to a 100-year life 
hydro-project would be nearly impossible. Uncertainties of the 
future, such as possible development of relatively costless fusion 
power, would render any attempt too speculative to be meaningful. 
The FPC evaluated the private alternative (of approximately 25-
year life) using a discount rate of 83/4% and included all state and 
federal taxes. 65 The Corps on the other hand evaluated Dickey-
Lincoln using a 3 1/4% rate, a 100-year life, and excluded all taxes 
except those lost from the lands to be covered by the reservoir-an 
obvious attempt to stack the deck in favor of the federal project. 
Obvious, because use of these three terms (i.e. 100-year life, 3 1/4% 
discount rate and essentially no taxes) in the evaluation of any 
capital-intensive project would favor a federal project instead of a 
private alternative paying standard private sector rates. 
To make a proper comparison would have required the FPC to 
evaluate the alternative private schemes (of 100-year life) with a 
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discount rate of 3 1/4% and no state and federal taxes. 
Because of the relatively small flow of the St. John, Dickey-
Lincoln would produce only 1 billion KWH/year.88 Most of that 
power would be transmitted to Boston for approximately 2 1/2 hours 
per day to be used to serve the peak needs of that city. This amount 
of electricity would amount to about 10% of the total New England 
peak period demand.87 Boston Edison claims its past records show 
that there is actually no well defined peak in Boston's consumption. 
Instead, use climbs to a "plateau" during the day and remains there 
for about eight hours and then drops off.88 
There are of course consumers other than Boston. These custom-
ers, consisting mostly of New England municipal electric utilities, 
have expressed a willingness to buy 600 MW of peaking power from 
the project.89 
The billion KWH/year that would be produced by Dicltey-Lincoln 
would in 1980 amount to about 1% of New England's total electrical 
demand.70 This may seem like a ridiculously small amount but the 
reader is reminded that the manner of its production and distribu-
tion will make it fully 10% of peak demand in the region. Percen-
tages are only ratios and as such can hide important facts. Even the 
large new Mystic River thermal plant, for instance, will supply only 
4% of New England's total demand. One must instead look at the 
margin, thinking of the many thousands of homes these small per-
centages could help heat or cool. 
The power from Dickey-Lincoln would be marketed by the De-
partment of Interior. The prices actually charged customers would 
not be those listed on the Corps' benefit analysis. Instead the prices 
are set such that those annual costs attributed to power (about 95%) 
would be repaid annually from the power revenues.71 The annual 
costs as calculated by the Interior Department are based on a 5 7/8% 
discount rate and a 50-year repayment period.72 All transmission, 
maintenance and construction costs are included. Non-power bene-
fits such as redevelopment and flood control are not required by the 
Department to be paid back by power revenues.73 Currently the 
Department of Interior expects to charge $0.025/KWH as compared 
to the so-called least-cost alternative charge of $0.0344.74 It is doubt-
ful that these prices would represent much of a savings to New 
Englanders, since they would apply only to about 1% of the region's 
total power, the annual bill for which is about $1.6 billion.75 Resi-
dents of small towns might save proportionately more, however, if 
their municipal power companies buy a considerable percentage of 
their power from the project. 
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2. Prevention of Flood Damages. This is one of the many bene-
fits for which a market price does not exist. It is however reasonable 
to assume that inhabitants of a potentially floodable area would be 
willing to pay at least the value of expected average flood losses in 
order to prevent the flood. Again, this willingness to pay is taken as 
the measure of benefits which is gained by construction of the pro-
ject. 
In the last 46 years of record the St. John has caused ten major 
floods in the area immediately below the dam site. Three of these 
have occurred in the last four years.76 The worst, in 1974, caused $3 
million worth of damage, mostly to the town of Fort Kent and the 
surrounding farm lands. The average yearly cost of these floods (not 
updated to include 1974) is $60,000, the value included in the Corps' 
BIC analysis. Unfortunately, this is strictly a monetary value placed 
on physical property losses and as such does not reflect the non-
quantifiable factors such as the human suffering that results from 
a flood. In addition, the Corps' quantity does not include the added 
productivity of the flood plain that would result from the removal 
of the threat of flooding. 
Because the Corps does not include these factors, it is probably 
safe to say that its figure of $60,000 is too low. But here again, it is 
nearly impossible to estimate the actual values. Fortunately for the 
overall analysis of this particular project this problem is not crucial. 
Even if this prevention benefit were twice as large, it would still be 
insignificant when compared with the total annual benefits. 
Those proponents of Dickey-Lincoln who favor the project solely 
on the grounds of its flood control benefits are treading on thin ice. 
There are many single-purpose alternatives to the project which 
would cost only a fraction of Dickey-Lincoln and yet yield much of 
the same flood control benefits. These alternatives include flood-
plain managing, flood control dikes, watershed replanting, etc. In 
fact, the Corps has plans for a $2 million dike to protect the town 
of Fort Kent. Even though the dike is not intended to protect the 
surrounding farm lands,77 it would result in the reduction of most 
of the flood damage in the area at a cost less than 2% of the bill for 
Dickey-Lincoln. 
3. Recreation. In the original Corps analysis of 1964, recreation 
benefits expected to result from the project were listed as zero. 
During the last updating, the Corps re-evaluated this factor and 
concluded that because of Dickey-Lincoln there would be an overall 
increase in the number of user-hours in the St. John watershed.78 If 
this increase could be multiplied by a realistic figure representing 
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recreationalists' willingness to pay, one would arrive at a value for 
recreational benefits from the project. Of course, determination of 
these two quantities (i.e. increase in user-hours and willingness to 
pay) is difficult, but the Corps has apparently made a stab at it, 
since it has produced a figure of $1.5 million for this benefit cate-
g9ry. Regrettably, the Corps has not yet made available the figures 
upon which the estimate is based. 
Ecology groups including the Sierra Club and the Appalachian 
Mountain Club argue that this quantity should be negative, reflect-
ing the losses in recreational opportunities that the project would 
bring. They back up their claims by citing such losses as: 
(a) Loss of brook trout fishing. Today the St. John along with 
the adjoining Allagash are rated as two of the 100 best trout fishing 
streams in the country.79 The brook trout currently inhabiting the 
St. John would be replaced by lake trout and other varities of lake-
type fish. 
(b) Loss of a wilderness wildlife habitat. Today the area 
abounds with deer, moose, and other wild animals. Its subjection to 
relatively light hunting has permitted the St. John watershed to 
serve as a storage area from which other more heavily hunted areas 
are replenished. Deer appear to be the species which would be hard-
est hit by the project. Currently there are 17,600 acres of deer yards 
(winter browsing grounds) that would be flooded by the reservoir. 
The flooding represents a potential loss to the area of 2200 deer.80 
Good conservation management could prevent most of this poten-
tialloss from becoming actual. Effects on other area wildlife are less 
foreseeable, though it is reasonable to hypothesize that wildlife 
numbers would decrease simply because 140 square miles would be 
covered by the reservoir. 
(c) Loss of a canoeable stream. The St. John and the Allagash 
are considered by many to be two of the best canoeing streams in 
the U.S.81 The anatomy of the Allagash watershed would not be 
directly affected by Dickey-Lincoln. However, canoeing enthusiasts 
who had previously used the St. John could be expected to switch 
to the Allagash, thereby increasing its use. Many wilderness enthu-
siasts already consider the Allagash too crowded. 
In 1966 it was estimated that about 4700 recreationalists used the 
upper St. John. 82 It is unclear what effect Dickey-Lincoln would 
have on total recreational use of the area, but the nature of the area 
would obviously be changed from the current wilderness stream-
type to a lake-type environment. If the lake were created somewhere 
in the arid southwest, near a large population center, use could be 
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expected to jump. However, Maine is blessed with many beautiful, 
large lakes which would tend to compete with the project lakes. But 
in the northeast, the St. John and the Allagash are the last two 
remaining wilderness streams. Thus because of its nearly unique 
characteristics, the wild, free-flowing St. John has a higher marginal 
utility to canoeists, hunters and brook fishermen than to lake-
boatmen, swimmers, etc., who have other resources at their dis-
posal. Consequently, it will take a greater number of the latter 
group, paying a lower market price, to equal the total benefit de-
rived from a smaller number of the first group, willing to pay a 
higher price (reflecting the river's higher marginal utility to· them 
in its present form). The new WRC standards have recognized this 
fact by establishing two classes of outdoor recreation, each with its 
own simulated market price. The "general" class, including boat-
ing, swimming, picnicking, and most warm water fishing, is to be 
valued at between $0.75 to $2.25 per user-day. The "specialized" 
class, including hunting, fishing etc. is to be valued between $3.00 
and $9.00 per user-day.s3 The Corps must be certain to take into 
account these different market prices when evaluating the recrea-
tional benefits of Dickey-Lincoln. 
4. Redevelopment. The area redevelopment benefit represents 
the effect of added employment that would result from the project. 
The Dickey-Lincoln project would be located in Aroostook County, 
where the mean income of 40% of the population was $3,000/year in 
1966.S( In calculating the redevelopment benefits, the Corps in-
cluded wages of the estimated 35 area people who would be contin-
ually employed during the life of the project. This quantity is then 
added to the wages (averaged over 100 years) of the estimated 550 
unemployed and underemployed local area people who would be 
hired during the construction period. S5 Thus the Corps' figure does 
not take into account the well known multiplier effect. When the 
project is completed there may be net added employment, both 
primary-e.g., technicians, engineers, etc. working for the project, 
and secondary-e.g., doctors, barbers, gas station owners, etc. who 
will be needed to provide goods and services both for the people 
employed directly by the project and for those attracted to the pro-
ject for other reasons, such as boaters, swimmers, etc. The local 
economy must consequently expand to adjust to the needs of the 
new employer. An example can illustrate the magnitude of this 
multiplier effect: before construction of the Glenn Canyon hydroe-
lectric dam on the Colorado River, the average population density 
of the area for a 100 mile radius was less than one person per square 
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mile. 86 In 1970, 6 years after the dam's completion, there existed a 
modern town of 1500 people (Page, Arizona),87 with an average wage 
of $10,00088 per year. All of the jobs are a direct result of the dam, 
which has added more than $4,500,000 to the local economy (450 
wage earners X $10,000).89 Granted, regional differences between the 
t~o areas require one to use caution in analogizing between the 
Glenn Canyon project and Dickey-Lincoln. For one thing, each year 
over a half million90 lake-hungry visitors come to Lake Powell, pri-
marily from the surrounding arid region, and thus supply many of 
the 450-plus jobs in Page. It is doubtful that the reservoir created 
by Dickey-Lincoln would attract nearly as many people, since the 
surrounding region abounds with lakes. Therefore, the Maine pro-
ject might not create as many secondary redevelopment benefits as 
the Arizona project. Nevertheless it is possible that Dickey-Lincoln 
may have much more far-reaching effects on the local economy than 
envisaged by the Corps. The net value of these effects depends 
greatly on one's definition of benefits. 
Certainly not all changes in the local economy brought about by 
the project would be positive. Currently the timber industry har-
vests $600,000 worth of lumber each year from the 75,000 acres of 
cutable forest land which would be covered by the reservoir. o1 Some 
opponents of the project claim that when the multiplier effect is 
taken into account, this harvestable land adds $200 per acre to the 
local economy of the St. John region. o2 If this is true, the building 
of Dickey-Lincoln would represent a whopping $15 million 
($200/acre times 75,000 acres) loss to the region's economy, over-
whelming any of the benefits accruing to the local area from the 
project. Proponents of the project counter by noting that 90% of the 
timber harvested from the area is being sold to nearby Canada and 
that most of it is being cut by Canadian labor.o3 The fact remains 
nevertheless that money is being pumped into the area from the 
lumbering industry. This revenue can be expected to increase as 
lumber prices continue to climb. Supporters of the project also 
argue however that the lumber companies have over-cut the St. 
John watershed, worsening the flooding problem and so depleting 
the number of mature trees that it will be another 40 years before a 
harvestable stand can be regrown.o• Though most of the calculations 
involved in the discussion of lumber industry benefits are highly 
debatable, one fact should be clear: if the 75,000 acres of forests are 
not flooded by the project, they would supply a substantial amount 
of renewable lumber sometime in the future and thus would contrib-
ute a considerable benefit to the local economy. 
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There is another potential danger to the local economy posed by 
the project. The dams would create a "boom and bust" effect on the 
locale. Construction employment is expected to increase steadily 
until the eighth and final year when it would be drastically cut. This 
abrupt cutback could be expected to be somewhat painful to the 
economy in the short run at least. 
Thus the two-sided nature of Dickey-Lincoln is apparent in 
strictly local economic terms as well. If the project is built, the 
region will experience immediate, rather large benefits (the con-
struction boom) which would drop suddenly to a level of benefits 
which might be less than those the area would experience if the 
project were not built at all. 
V. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
Conservationists have been vehemently opposed to the project. 
Some of the reasons for their antipathy have been included in the 
"Recreation" discussion, supra. But there would be other impacts 
on the immediate area, including; 
(a) a 40-foot fluctuating water level periodically exposing 30,000 
acres of so-called "bath tub ring;" 
(b) installation of 150 miles of transmission lines through 
Maine; 
(c) strip-mining of aggregate for the dams from the site area; 
(d) building of 5 dikes, some located in remote parts of the area. 
Some of these environmental consequences would be clearly irre-
trievable losses which would be traded off for the benefits to be 
derived from the project. Other effects, such as loss of wildlife, could 
be reduced through sound planning. Some of these problems will 
hopefully be put into sharper focus when the Corps submits an 
Environmental Impact Statement. 
There are, of course, also positive environmental effects to be 
expected from the project. Dickey-Lincoln will produce safe, non-
polluting energy from a renewable source. Neither of the two current 
power alternatives (nuclear or fossil fuel)95 can claim these ex-
tremely attractive features. This is the root of the dilemma which 
faces environmentalists if the premise is accepted that New Eng-
land's power consumption must, or at least will, increase. They have 
chosen to try to save a wilderness area at the possible cost to the 
environment of having to cope with the additional types and 
amounts of pollution which would be produced by additional nu-
clear or fossil fuel plants. 
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VI. PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE CORPS' ANALYSIS 
After careful consideration of the Corps' Economic Analysis of 
Dickey-Lincoln, the writer proposes the following changes (see 
Table II): 
(a) the discount rate be changed from 33/4% to 8 3/4%, the rate 
used by the FPC with respect to the private alternative (thus plac-
ing the alternative on an equal footing with the project for compari-
son purposes), and because this value falls within the bounds of 
feasible discount rates suggested by economists; 
(b) the project life be changed to 50 years in order to make 
discounting techniques more valid, although at the higher social 
discount rate of 8 3/4% this change is less important; 
(c) an item be added to the initial construction costs in order to 
include inflation which can be expected to occur during the con-
struction period; 
(d) an annual cost of $2 million/year be added to represent in-
surance and taxes paid by the least-cost alternative-again, to 
make comparison more valid; 
(e) recreation benefits be carried at zero until the Corps is able 
to show that use of the area by general category recreationalists 
would increase enough to more than offset the losses to present users 
in the special category. 
Redevelopment benefits should remain unchanged, but not with-
out noting that this quantity might well decrease if, upon further 
study, it should be shown that the region has indeed not been over-
cut and will continue to produce the amount of lumber currently 
being harvested; thus making up for the loss of $600,000 annually 
in timber revenues currently collected. On the other hand, if the 
Corps can show that the net value ofrecreational use of the area will 
substantially increase, thereby creating more secondary employ-
ment opportunities, this redevelopment quantity should be in-
creased accordingly. 
All other calculations by the Corps remain unchanged, although 
some of them, especially the initial construction costs, are question-
able for reasons already discussed. 
If the suggested changes are incorporated into the analysis, the 
BIC ratio falls slightly below unity. In the strictest economic sense 
the project is not economically justifiable. However, one should note 
that the economic consequences of almost all the opponents' major 
criticisms were included in the evaluation (the exceptions being 
construction costs and redevelopment), tilting the analysis some-
what in their favor. In spite of this recalculation, the B/C ratio 
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remains very close to unity, indicating that minor changes in a few 
key factors could make the project quite viable, at least as compared 
to other federal projects that have been built in the past. 
One must keep in mind that the above analysis is necessarily 
somewhat inaccurate. An updated Corps analysis, faithfully follow-
ing the WRC standards, would be much more desirable. The au-
thor's analysis is rather an attempt to rectify what seem to be the 
more obvious shortcomings of the Corps' current evaluation and to 
get a more quantitative appreciation for the effect that changes 
suggested by opponents would have on the BIC ratio. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The status of Dickey-Lincoln is changing rapidly, due in part to 
the varying Middle East situation and the energy crisis. Despite this 
state of flux there are some basic problems concerning the project 
that remain unchanged. These include: 
(a) the uncertain yet highly influential natures of the social dis-
count rate and the project life; 
(b) the uncertainty of construction cost estimates; 
(c) the inadequacy of discounting techniques in long term pro-
ject evaluation; 
(d) the FPC's mis-application of the alternative-cost method of 
evaluation; 
(e) . the inability to quantify some benefits and costs associated 
with the project, especially redevelopment, recreation and environ-
mental costs and benefits; 
(f) the recreational trade-off: swapping whitewater canoeing, 
backpacking, stream fishing, etc., for more commonly accessible 
forms of recreation such as lake boating and fishing, swimming and 
picknicking; 
(g) the uncertain impact of the project on overall area redevel-
opment; 
(h) the environmental trade-off: a relatively small amount of 
pollution-free, renewable, safe power versus the relatively "dirty" 
nuclear or fossil fuel alternative. 
It is very unsatisfying to work through an analysis and evaluation 
such as the above and at the end not have a definite "yes" or "no" 
answer to the problem that was posed. Yet this is the predicament 
of an analyst of the Dickey-Lincoln Project. The project appears to 
be neither the boon to New England claimed by its proponents nor 
the ecological disaster claimed by its opponents. It is instead a 
seemingly even trade-off. Only with additional information, not 
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available at this time, can a rational judgment be made about the 
project. The additional information should include a truly updated 
and reworked Corps analysis, not the fudged one currentlyavail-
able; at least one professional, independent analysis; an Environ-
mental Impact Statement; a much closer look at the "Redevelop-
ment" impact of the project; clarification of the basis for the Corps' 
projected "Recreation" benefits. Also required are quantitative 
evaluations of such alternatives as 
(a) federally financed installation of insulation into private 
buildings; 
(b) peak power pricing; 
(c) zero power growth; 
(d) different methods of stimulating the depressed economy of 
northern Maine; and 
(e) the possible installation of flood-control dams above the 
Dickey area. 
Some of this information will be disclosed when the Corps finishes 
its re-analysis of the project. It should be noted that if the new WRC 
criteria were conscientiously applied in the analysis of Dickey-
Lincoln most of these questions would be answered. Regardless of 
how the information is obtained, it will cost money. It would be 
funds well spent, since without this additional knowledge a rational 
answer to the ultimate question posed by Dickey-Lincoln is not 
possible. That final conundrum remains: whether a small but signif-
cant amount of cheap, pollutionless, renewable, inheritable power 
is worth the investment of hundreds of millions of dollars of scarce 
capital and the destruction of an ecosubsystem dependent upon one 
of the few remaining wilderness streams. 
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TABLE I 
U.S. ARMY CORP OF ENGINEERS 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS-ANNUAL COSTS AND BENEFITS 
(based on 31/4 % interest rate and 100-year life) 
TOTAL INVESTMENT-DAMS 
Construction Costs of Dams 
Interest During Construction 
Total Investment 
Capital Recovery factor 100 yr. life 
ANNUAL COSTS-DAMS 
Interest and Amortization 
Operation and Maintenance 
Major Replacements 
Loss of Land Taxes 
Sub-Total Dams 
TOTAL INVESTMENT-POWER LINES 
Construction Costs of Transmission Line 
Interest During Construction 
Total Investment 
ANNUAL COSTS-POWER LINES 
Interest and Amortization 
Operation and Maintenance 
Major Replacements 
Sub-Total Trans. Lines 
TOTAL ANNUAL COSTS 
Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes Dams 
Transmission Lines (50%) 
ANNUAL COSTS 
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DICKEY -LINCOLN SCHOOL LAKES 
ANNUAL BENEFITS 
Marketed in Maine 
105,000 kw x 0.95 x $54.25 
372,000,000 kwh x 0.95 x $.010 
Marketed in Boston 
725,000 kw x 0.905 x $16.50 
782,000,000 kwh x 0.929 x $.030 
Downstream 
350,000,000 kwh x $.008 
Sub-Total Power 
PREVENTION OF FLOOD DAMAGES 
RECREATION 
REDEVELOPMENT 
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TABLE II 
REVISED ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
TOTAL INVESTMENT-DAMS 
Construction Costs of Dams 
>Inflation During Constr. Period (6V2%) 
> Interest During Construction 
Total Investment-Dams 
>Capital Recovery Factor 
(50 yr. life & 83/4%) 
ANNUAL COSTS-DAMS 
> Interest and Amortization 
Operation & Maintenance 
Major Replacements 
> Loss of Land Taxes 
TOTAL INVESTMENT-POWER LINES 
Construction Costs 
> Interest During Construction 
Total Investment-Lines 
ANNUAL COST-POWER LINES 
> Interest & Amortization 
Operation and Maintenance 
Major Replacements 
Sub-Total Lines 
TOTAL ANNUAL COSTS 
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